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OIL AND THE IRAQ WAR:  
HOW THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE EXPECTED TO BENEFIT, AND MIGHT 
STILL 
By John S. Duffield 
The Bush Administration has offered a variety of justifications for its decision to go to war against 
Iraq. Initially, it emphasized the threat to U.S. national security posed by Iraq’s alleged possession 
of weapons of mass destruction and ties to international terrorists. More recently, it has stressed 
the need to promote democracy in the Middle East. Along the way, it has also highlighted Saddam 
Hussein’s despotic rule and human rights abuses. 
Conspicuously absent from these justifications has been any discussion of the possible oil-related 
benefits. To the contrary, members of the administration have been virtually silent on the subject. 
The major public statements made by President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have contained hardly 
any mention of oil. And defenders outside the government of the administration’s policy have 
flatly denied that the war had anything to do with it.1 
This silence on the question of oil is puzzling in view of what is arguably most distinct about Iraq’s 
circumstances. Other rogue states have been much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than was 
Iraq in early 2003, and others have had more extensive ties to anti-American terrorists. Likewise, 
a number of other states around the world have fallen equally short of adhering to democratic 
principles or have engaged in massive human rights abuses. But of all the states where the United 
States has considered regime change, Iraq is one of only a few to possess substantial amounts of 
oil, and it sits squarely in the middle of nearly two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves. 
Precisely for this reason, a primary justification offered by the U.S. government for going to war 
in 1990-91 was the economic benefits of ending Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.2 And not 
surprisingly, critics of the 2003 war, both in the United States and abroad, frequently argued that 
a principal U.S. motive for deposing Saddam Hussein was to gain access to Iraq’s substantial oil 
resources and thereby obtain leverage over world oil supplies and prices.3 Indeed, according to a 
Pew Research Center poll conducted shortly before the war began, a majority of respondents in 
France (75 percent), Germany (54 percent), and Russia (76 percent) agreed with the statement that 
“the United States wanted to control Iraqi oil.”4 
Of course, it is possible that oil-related considerations did not play a significant role in the 
administration’s decision to go to war. Certainly, despite the problems with the arguments 
employed by the administration officials that have been pointed out, a number of other seemingly 
plausible rationales existed in early 2003 for taking military action. Moreover, the administration’s 
well-documented failure to prepare adequately for the subsequent occupation of Iraq suggests a 
surprising disregard for many other practical matters associated with the war.5 
Even if oil did not figure prominently in the administration’s decision-making process, however, 
one should not conclude that the potential oil-related consequences were unimportant. To the 
contrary, the United States could have been expected to benefit significantly with regard to oil in 
at least two ways.  
First, the elimination of Saddam Hussein’s regime could have been expected to end once and for 
all Iraq’s long-standing threat to dominate either directly or through coercion the vast oil resources 
of the Gulf. Although Iraq may not have possessed any usable weapons of mass destruction or may 
have been deterred from using them by the United States, both the UN sanctions’ regime and the 
U.S. military presence in the region were coming under strain and might not have been expected 
to contain and deter Iraq indefinitely. 
Second, regime change could have been expected to free up Iraq’s substantial oil production 
potential, which had been artificially constrained by war damage, sanctions, and a lack of 
investment. Both of these changes could in turn have been expected to increase the stability of 
world oil markets in the medium to long term. 
Of course, the degree to which these potential benefits will in fact be realized remains to be seen. 
On the one hand, the war has ended for the foreseeable future the threat posed by Iraq to its 
neighbors. On the other hand, the prospects for rehabilitating and expanding Iraq’s oil sector 
remain uncertain, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, and regardless of the role oil may have 
played in the administration’s prewar calculus, the magnitude of the potential oil-related benefits 
give the United States a continuing interest in helping to ensure that Iraq is able to rehabilitate and 
expand its oil production and export capacity. 
This article elaborates on the potential oil-related benefits to the United States of regime change 
in Iraq, especially as they might have appeared prior to the final decision to go to war in late 2002 
and early 2003. It first describes the importance of Persian Gulf oil to world oil markets. It then 
discusses the nature of the threat posed by Iraq under Saddam Hussein to the other oil-producing 
states in the region. In a third section, it identifies the constraints that had hobbled Iraqi oil 
production and the potential benefits of removing those constraints. The conclusion considers the 
implications for U.S. policy in Iraq.  
BACKGROUND: THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSIAN GULF OIL TO THE UNITED 
STATES 
In 2002, just prior to the Iraq war, the United States consumed approximately 19.7 million barrels 
per day (MMBD) of oil. Of this, 10.5 MMBD (53 percent) represented net imports, but only 2.3 
MMBD–12 percent of U.S. consumption–came from the Middle East.6 Nevertheless, the United 
States could be severely affected by a disruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies through two 
mechanisms. First, such a disruption would negatively impact the economies of major U.S. trading 
partners in Europe and Asia, which are more heavily dependent on imported oil in general and 
Persian Gulf oil in particular. An oil-shock induced recession in those areas would undoubtedly 
ripple through the world economy, with deleterious effects for levels of production and 
employment in the United States, regardless of the level of U.S. oil imports.7 
Second, even if the United States did not import a single barrel of oil from the Persian Gulf, a 
sharp increase in the price of oil on world markets following a disruption of oil supplies from the 
region would inevitably cause oil prices to rise just as much within the United States.8 This is 
because “the United States and the other major oil importers are all part of a single, seamless oil 
market driven by supply and demand…”9 As long as a country either imports significant amounts 
of oil or allows the price of domestically produced oil to be determined by world oil markets, it 
will be vulnerable to the effects of oil supply interruptions wherever they may occur. And in 2002, 
some 41.4 percent of all oil exports (18.1 of 43.6 MMBD) came from the Middle East.10 
Although levels of oil consumption and production are notoriously difficult to forecast, the 
importance of Persian Gulf oil is likely only to increase in the coming decades. Global demand for 
oil has risen by some 30 percent over the last 20 years, and in early 2003, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) projected that demand would grow from 77.1 MMBD in 2001 
to 118.8 MMBD by 2025, a further increase of more than 41 MMBD or 54 percent.11 The EIA also 
predicted that net oil imports by the United States, Europe, and Japan would grow, with those of 
the United States nearly doubling to 19.8 MMBD by 2025. 
Simultaneously, the Middle East has been expected to loom ever larger in world oil markets. 
According to recent EIA and International Energy Agency (IEA) projections, the Middle East’s 
share of total oil production (28.4 percent in 2002) may increase to more than 34 percent in 202512 
and then 43 percent in 2030.13 Likewise, the EIA projected that the share of all oil exports coming 
from the Persian Gulf would exceed 67 percent by 2020.14 
The main reason for the centrality of the Persian Gulf in these projections is the fact that nearly 
two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves lie in the region. In 2002, Saudi Arabia alone 
possessed a quarter of all proven oil reserves (262 billion barrels), and Iraq itself ranked second, 
with nearly 11 percent (112.5 billion barrels). Most of the balance was provided by Kuwait (9.2 
percent), Iran (8.6 percent), and the United Arab Emirates (9.3 percent).15 
In view of the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the United States, it should come as no surprise 
that a principal goal of U.S. national security policy since World War II, and especially since the 
1970s, has been to guarantee access to that oil for the United States and its allies, if necessary 
through the use of military force. When this policy was first publicly articulated in the form of the 
Carter Doctrine in early 1980, shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the ostensible 
concern was that a hostile external power might attempt to gain control of oil supplies in the region. 
Especially since the end of the cold war, however, the most likely risks have taken two other forms. 
A leading such risk is the danger that one or more states with control over a substantial share of 
world oil exports would attempt to exploit their market power to raise prices or to exert political 
pressure, most likely to the detriment of the United States. The classic example of the use of the 
so-called “oil weapon” was the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which demonstrated that the amount of oil 
involved need not be substantial in order to have major effects. In that case, a temporary reduction 
in Arab oil production of less than 25 percent (representing less than ten percent of global 
production) nevertheless contributed to a four-fold increase in oil prices.16 Similar fears followed 
Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait in 1990, which if uncontested would have left the former in control of 
some 20 percent of proven oil reserves and in a better position to exercise coercive influence over 
Saudi Arabia. 
The other risk is that of a sudden disruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies as a result of an intra-
regional conflict or internal upheaval. Such disruptions have occurred several times in the past, 
although with varying consequences. Because of the ready availability of alternative sources of 
oil, neither the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 nor the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti production 
during the 1990-91 Gulf War had a major impact on world oil supplies and prices. In contrast, both 
the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War reduced the flow of oil 
from the region to such an extent that global supplies were affected and prices again increased 
sharply, more than doubling in the former instance. 
ENDING THE IRAQI THREAT TO DOMINATE GULF REGION 
The first way in which the United States might have been expected to benefit from regime change 
was by ending the long-standing Iraqi threat under Saddam Hussein to dominate the Persian Gulf 
and its oil resources. In 1980, Iraq attacked Iran, seeking to exploit the internal turmoil roiling its 
neighbor to make a variety of political and territorial gains. Then in 1990, just two years after the 
conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq invaded and quickly occupied Kuwait, and it seemed poised 
to threaten Saudi Arabia as well. 
Following the 1991 Gulf War, the threat posed by Iraq to its neighbors was neutralized by a 
combination of UN sanctions and a greatly increased U.S. military presence in the region. The 
former made it difficult for the country to reconstitute its military power, while the latter was 
intended to deter any future Iraqi attempts at aggression. Nevertheless, many outside observers 
believed that Saddam Hussein had abandoned neither his ambitions to dominate the Gulf nor his 
efforts to develop an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction that would help him to realize that 
goal. As time passed, moreover, it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain both the 
sanctions required to limit Iraq’s military power and the U.S. military presence required to deter 
its use. Consequently, as the Bush Administration settled into office in 2001, it was possible to 
imagine that Saddam Hussein might once again make a bid for regional hegemony and control 
over the Gulf’s oil resources if he were allowed to remain in power. 
A. Nature of the Threat 
Indeed, prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, members of the Bush Administration justified 
a tough U.S. policy primarily in terms of the threat that Iraq posed to the United States and its most 
fundamental interests. Iraq was described in no uncertain terms as possessing a substantial arsenal 
of weapons of mass destruction that might soon include nuclear weapons, and high-level officials 
insisted that Saddam Hussein would not hesitate to use these weapons directly once it had the 
opportunity or to make them available to terrorists. As Vice-President Cheney told an audience in 
Nashville in August 2002, “Simply stated, there is no doubt Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass 
destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, 
and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into 
future confrontations with his neighbors.”17 
As a result, much has been made of the fact that no weapons of mass destruction have been found 
in Iraq. Nevertheless, prior to the war, U.S. and other Western intelligence agencies believed that 
Iraq probably possessed significant quantities of chemical and biological weapons (or the ability 
to produce them) and that it had an active nuclear weapons program.18 Most importantly, many 
reasonable people feared that Saddam Hussein would be able to acquire a formidable arsenal of 
nuclear weapons in as little as a few years, if left unchecked. Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA and 
NSC official, presented one of the most compelling cases for military action. In his view, Iraq had 
essentially figured out how to build nuclear weapons, had been able to hang on to most of the 
knowledge and equipment that it needed, and was probably working to enrich uranium. 
Consequently, according to German and U.S. intelligence estimates he cited, Iraq might have been 
able to make a nuclear weapon in as few as three to five years. And, Pollack concluded, if Iraq was 
able to buy enriched uranium, as it appeared to be attempting to do, “it could probably build a 
workable device in a year or two.”19 
Largely overlooked in the debates over Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), moreover, 
were the country’s conventional military capabilities. Yet these, too, posed a significant potential 
threat to its neighbors, just as they had in the past. As Pollack also observed, “Despite the 
devastation of the Gulf War and sanctions, Iraqi forces remain large enough to give them an edge 
over any single Persian Gulf state or any combination of them…. Moreover, Iraqi forces possess 
a qualitative edge over the Persian Gulf states that magnify their quantitative advantage.”20 To be 
sure, the Gulf War and subsequent UN sanctions had exacted a considerable toll, especially in the 
area of logistics. As a result, “Iraq almost certainly ha[d] lost the ability to mount sustained ground 
offensives that could threaten GCC oil production beyond Kuwait and, perhaps, northernmost 
Saudi Arabia.”21 Nevertheless, he continued, in the absence of U.S. forces, the Republican Guards 
could probably overrun Kuwait again as they did in 1990, albeit with greater difficulty because of 
the state of Iraqi logistics. Iraqi forces might be able to undertake similarly limited operations 
versus Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran, although they probably could not replicate the multi-corps 
offensives they staged against Iran in 1988. Thus, Pollack concluded, “Even in their current 
weakened state, Iraq’s [conventional] capabilities would pose a significant threat to regional 
stability if the United States were ever to pull its forces out of the region.”22 
What might Saddam Hussein have been expected to do with such an arsenal? Even with nuclear 
weapons, it is almost inconceivable that he would have tried to attack directly the United States or 
any of its traditional allies, including Israel. Such an attack would certainly have been met by a 
devastating response. Hardly more likely was the possibility that Saddam would have provided 
weapons of mass destruction to terrorists bent on striking the United States. Any weapons so used 
might well have been traced back to their source, prompting no less devastating a retaliation, and 
even if no direct link could have been found, U.S. officials are likely, with some justification, to 
have blamed Saddam and responded accordingly. Thus, Pollack flatly concluded, “Terrorism is 
the least of the threats posed by Iraq to the interests of the United States,” and “Saddam Hussein 
is not likely to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.”23 
Instead, the far more likely scenario was that Iraq would have sought to use its weapons to 
dominate the Middle East, and especially its oil-rich neighbors, as evidenced not least by its 
previous behavior. In Pollack’s view, “Saddam Hussein [was] determined to overturn the status 
quo to make himself the hegemon of the Persian Gulf region and the leader of the Arab 
world�?¯�?¿�?½.”24 Likewise, Vice President Cheney argued in his August 2002 Nashville 
speech, “Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and seated atop ten percent of the 
world’s oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire 
Middle East [and] take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies…”25 
If Saddam Hussein achieved this objective, Pollack noted, “He [would] use this power to advance 
Iraq’s political interests, even to the detriment of its economic interests and the world’s… If 
Saddam Hussein were ever to control the Persian Gulf oil resources, his past record suggests that 
he would be willing to cut or even halt oil exports altogether whenever it suited him, in order to 
force concessions from his fellow Arabs, Europe, the United States, or the world as a whole.” 26And 
even if he failed, he could still wreak considerable havoc on the region and world oil supplies. 
Thus, Cheney concluded in a retrospective defense of the decision to go to war, “had we followed 
the counsel of inaction, the Iraqi regime would still be a menace to its neighbors and a destabilizing 
force in the Middle East.”27  
B. Growing Difficulties with Containing and Deterring Iraq 
Fortunately, Saddam had not yet been able to realize his ambition of regional hegemony. Iran had 
managed to reverse its initial losses in the Iran-Iraq War, and the United States and others had 
intervened decisively to roll back the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Subsequently, the UN mandated 
the destruction of Iraq’s WMD, imposed inspections to verify Iraqi compliance, and erected a 
tough sanctions regime to prevent Iraq from reconstituting its conventional and unconventional 
military capabilities. In addition, the United States had established a significant military presence 
in the Gulf designed to deter any future Iraqi acts of aggression. 
For the better part of a decade, these measures were largely successful at neutralizing the Iraqi 
threat. In the late 1990s, however, UN inspections were ended and, as time wore on, the sanctions 
regime and important components of the U.S. military presence had become increasingly difficult 
to maintain. As a result, one could again imagine a time when Saddam Hussein would once more 
be free to pursue his goal of dominating the Gulf. 
A number of countries, including some permanent members of the UN Security Council, had never 
been enthusiastic about the sanctions in view of the costs they imposed and the lost economic 
opportunities they represented. And over the years, the sanctions had come under increasing 
international criticism because of the humanitarian crisis that they were allegedly causing in Iraq. 
In the mid-1990s, the Security Council had made a serious attempt to address the latter problem 
by allowing Iraq to export a considerable amount of oil in order to earn the foreign exchange 
required to purchase foodstuffs, medicines, and other humanitarian supplies abroad, the so-called 
“oil for food” program. But the crisis did not seem to abate, in no small part because of Saddam’s 
deft manipulation of the sanctions, and pressure continued to grow to eliminate or at least dilute 
the sanctions substantially. Thus in December 1999, the Security Council lifted the cap on the 
amount of oil Iraq could sell and greatly expanded the types of goods it could import. 
At the same time, Saddam Hussein was proving increasingly adept at evading the sanctions. Iraq 
was able to divert a rapidly growing amount of oil from legitimate sales via the oil for food program 
to smuggling by truck, pipeline, and boat. In 1999, according to Kenneth Pollack, the United States 
estimated that only about five percent of Iraq’s oil revenues were skirting the UN system, whereas 
just two years later, that share had grown to roughly 20 percent.28Simultaneously, Iraq had also 
managed since 2000 to skim money from the legitimate oil sales by demanding surcharges on each 
barrel of sold. All told, Pollack estimated, “Whereas as recently as 1999, Saddam’s regime netted 
only about $350 million [outside the oil for food program], in 2002 it will rake in $2.5-3 billion, 
representing 15-22 percent of all Iraqi revenue.”29 This was a vast sum that Saddam could spend 
however he liked, and Iraq was “using the money to import prohibited items for its conventional 
military and WMD programs.”30 
In the face of these mounting challenges to the sanctions regime, the Bush Administration pursued 
a two-prong strategy. On the one hand, it agreed to loosen further restrictions on the import of 
civilian goods while attempting to ensure that items with overt military applications remained 
blocked in order to blunt the pressure to end sanctions altogether. On the other hand, it sought to 
deal with the problem of smuggling by bringing illegal oil shipments within the UN program. By 
mid-2002, however, both efforts had floundered in the face of determined opposition to any 
toughening of the sanctions from Russia, France, and China, which favored even looser 
restrictions, and the Security Council could agree on no more than narrowing the list of prohibited 
dual-use items.31 
As a result, U.S. officials could not count on the sanctions regime to remain effective at containing 
Saddam’s military power indefinitely. To the contrary, according to Pollack, “the changes the UN 
agreed to in the spring of 2002… [Would] probably allow Iraq to make a partial recovery of its 
Gulf War military strength…. Within a period of as little as three to five years, Iraqi may be able 
to recover its former logistical prowess….”32 
Of course, a robust U.S. military presence in the Gulf region might have been sufficient to keep 
even a strengthening Iraq in check, although there was some question as to whether it could deter 
a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein. In any case, however, the difficulties of maintaining the critical 
American military presence were growing. The problem was most acute in Saudi Arabia, where 
U.S. military facilities had already been subjected to attacks. In fact, the U.S. presence in the land 
of Islam’s two holiest shrines was stoking anti-American sentiment throughout the Muslim world, 
as well as criticism of the Saudi ruling family. Indeed, Usama bin Ladin had cited it as a major 
reason for his war against the United States. 
One immediate consequence of this growing antipathy was the imposition of restrictions on how 
U.S. forces in the region could be employed. Most prominently, Saudi Arabia insisted in 2001 that 
American bases on its soil not be used to carry out air strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
although it did allow the United States to use the command and control center at Prince Sultan 
airbase to coordinate the air campaign.33 More fundamentally, it raised questions about the long-
term viability of the American military presence. Indeed, regional expert Gregory Gause 
concluded, “After the attacks of September 11, 2002, an American military presence in the 
kingdom [was] no longer sustainable in the political system of either the United States or Saudi 
Arabia.”34 Consequently, as Kenneth Pollack wrote in mid-2003, “The best way for the United 
States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability in Saudi Arabia and the 
other GCC states would be to reduce its military presence in the region to the absolute minimum, 
or even to withdraw entirely.”35 
Instead, the United States would have to rely increasingly “on the smaller gulf monarchies to 
provide the infrastructure for its military presence in the region.”36 It had already made use of these 
countries, especially Kuwait and Bahrain, which had hosted U.S. forces, and there were several 
reasons to expect greater acceptance of the American military in those states than in Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, an American presence there was not unproblematic, and Gause concluded, “A close 
military association with the United States might become more difficult to sustain domestically in 
the future.” Public opinion, where it could be measured, held unfavorable views of U.S. policies 
in the region, and elections were expected to result in parliaments that were less supportive of U.S. 
policy objectives than were the ruling regimes.37 
In view of these developments, it became reasonable to fear that the political-military edifice 
erected to contain and deter Iraq following the Gulf War might not last. Instead, it would become 
increasingly difficult to prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and from 
embarking once again upon the path of regional domination, with tumultuous consequences for 
world oil markets. Indeed, this danger was recognized by Rumsfeld and a number of other future 
high-level Bush Administration officials in a January 1998 letter to President Clinton: 
If Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as 
he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of 
American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate 
Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at 
hazard (emphasis added).8 
The only sure way to avoid this highly undesirable outcome would be to make certain that Saddam 
did not outlast the UN sanctions regime and the U.S. military presence. 
FREEING UP IRAQI OIL PRODUCTION 
A second general way in which the United States might have been expected to benefit from the 
removal of Saddam Hussein was through the effect such a move might have on Iraqi oil production 
and exports. 
A. Iraq’s Oil Production Potential 
By all accounts, Iraq has had the potential to be one of the world’s largest oil producers and 
exporters. In 2002, it possessed the second-largest proven oil reserves, approximately 112 billion 
barrels, and it’s probable and possible reserves have been estimated as high as 220 billion barrels. 
Ninety percent of the country, including most of its Western desert, has not been explored. Of the 
74 oil fields–including nine supergiant fields–that had been discovered and evaluated as of 2002, 
moreover, only 15, containing less than 40 billion barrels, had actually been developed.39 In short, 
“Iraq is one of the few countries where giant and even supergiant fields have been discovered but 
remain undeveloped and where the probability of further discoveries is among the highest.”40 
Not only does Iraq boast substantial untapped reserves, but its oil exploration, development, and 
production costs are among the lowest. Because Iraq’s oil is often close to the surface, it is more 
easily accessible than in many parts of the world, and it has been necessary to drill only a relatively 
small number of wells–approximately 2,300 in all of Iraq compared with about one million in 
Texas alone–to exploit it.41 According to one estimate, the cost of future expansion around the 
existing major fields should be in the region of $1.9 billion per MMBD of production capacity in 
the south and $950 million per MMBD in the north. New production capacity in other discovered 
fields would cost $3-4 billion per MMBD and should not exceed $5 billion per MMBD.42 And once 
the wells are in the ground, Iraqi oil costs as little as a dollar per barrel to produce.43 
Nevertheless, for political reasons, Iraq’s oil potential was developed relatively slowly. In 1961, 
shortly after gaining its independence, Iraq revoked almost the entire oil concession held by the 
privately owned Iraq Petroleum Company. As a result, foreign investment in new exploration and 
production virtually stopped, and Iraqi output edged up only gradually through the 1960s, 
achieving an annual rate of just 1.55 MMBD in 1970.44 It was only after the oil industry was 
nationalized in the 1970s that investment resumed, resulting in new discoveries and rapid growth 
in production, which reached 3.7 MMBD in 1979.45 
B. Constraints on Iraqi Oil Production under Saddam Hussein 
Since then, however, Iraqi oil production has labored under a number of constraints, which have 
caused it to remain far short of its potential. The first of these constraints was the damage inflicted 
on Iraq’s oil infrastructure during the wars initiated by Saddam Hussein. During the early weeks 
of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s deepwater oil terminal at Al-Bakr in the Persian Gulf was seriously 
disabled.46 As a result, Iraqi oil exports plummeted from over 3 MMBD to less than 1 MMBD in 
1981, and Iraq would be unable to make oil shipments from its Gulf terminals for eight years.47 
Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq set about repairing the remaining damage, and 
its oil exports grew rapidly. In 1990, the level of production reached 3.5 MMBD, just shy of the 
all-time high of 1979. Hardly had the Iraqi oil industry recovered from that war, however, than it 
received an even more devastating blow during the 1991 Gulf War. According to the EIA, an 
estimated 60 percent of the Northern Oil Company’s facilities were damaged in the conflict, and 
the southern oil industry was decimated.48 Overall, by one estimate, U.S.-led bombing during the 
Gulf War cut Iraq’s production capacity to 1.1 MMBD.49 
In theory, much of the damage incurred during the Gulf War could have been quickly repaired, 
just at it had been during and immediately after the Iran-Iraq War. This time, however, repair and 
reconstruction were obstructed by the comprehensive UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990 and 
left in place after the war. The sanctions prevented Iraq from obtaining the latest technology, spare 
parts, and foreign investment for its oil fields.50 Even after Iraq was authorized to spend up to $600 
million per year on spare parts and equipment under the oil-for-food program, the actual delivery 
was largely delayed on account of restrictions imposed by the UN Sanctions Committee.51 As one 
report bluntly concluded, “After two major wars and a decade of sanctions, Iraq’s oil industry is 
in desperate need of repair and investment.”52 
As a result of these constraints, Iraq’s oil production capacity remained well below its potential, 
and was even falling in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A significant number of wells had ceased 
production, and many of those had suffered irreparable damage.53 Just months before the 2003 Iraq 
war, a Council on Foreign Relations/Baker Institute report estimated Iraq’s sustainable oil 
production capacity at no higher than 2.6 to 2.8 MMBD, with production levels declining by 
100,000 barrels per day each year.54 And a secret government task force established in fall 2002 
offered an even bleaker assessment, pegging Iraq’s production capacity at only 2.1 to 2.4 MMBD.55 
The situation was not helped by Saddam Hussein’s attempts to manipulate Iraqi oil for political 
advantage. As recently as early 2002, he had temporarily suspended oil exports in order to exert 
pressure on the United States and Israel.56 In the process, “Iraq [had] severely tested the resilience 
of its oil fields by sporadically shutting down oil exports for political reasons over the past two 
years.”57 
C. Future Oil Production Scenarios 
By 2002, if not much earlier, it had become clear that the quickest way to remove the constraints 
that had hobbled Iraqi oil production was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Regime change 
could occasion the lifting of the UN sanctions and, perhaps even more importantly, facilitate a 
resumption of investment in exploration and development. It would also mean the end of Saddam’s 
manipulation of Iraqi oil production and exports for political purposes. 
Although the impact on Iraqi oil production would not be felt overnight, many experts estimated 
that a significant increase could be effected in a relatively short amount of time by historical 
standards. As a first step, Iraq’s pre-existing production capacity of approximately 3.5 MMBD 
would have to be restored, but this could be accomplished in just 18 months to three years.58 
Beyond that, estimates varied considerably, but all foresaw a further significant increase in Iraq’s 
oil production capacity. At the low end, the Middle East Economic Survey estimated that Iraq 
could reach a production capacity of 4.5-6.0 MMBD within seven years.59 Energy expert Daniel 
Yergin noted that Iraqi production could rise to 5.5 MMBD sometime after 2010.60 And former 
Iraqi Oil Minister Issam Chalabi estimated that, with the right investments, Iraq could be producing 
around 6 MMBD by the end of the decade.61 Under any of these scenarios, Iraq would become the 
fourth-largest producer and third largest exporter of oil in the world. 
Others offered even more optimistic views of Iraq’s production potential. Former Iraqi 
Undersecretary of Oil Fadhil Chalabi estimated that, with sufficient foreign investment, Iraq’s 
production capacity could be increased to 7 MMBD within five years and 8 MMBD over six to 
eight years.62 In the longer term, he ventured, “A totally rehabilitated and sanctions-free Iraq 
could expand its production capacity way beyond 8 [MMBD], easily reaching 10 [MMBD], and 
theoretically even 12 [MMBD] under certain conditions…”63 Likewise, former Vice-President 
and Executive Director of the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) Tariq Shafiq, estimated after 
the war that Iraq’s present proven reserves could support a production rate of 10 MMBD and 12 
MMBD as new potential reserves were brought in.64 
D. Benefits of Increased Iraqi Oil Production 
Freeing up Iraq’s tremendous oil production potential could have been expected to result in several 
significant benefits. First, it could help to meet anticipated growth in the world demand for oil. 
Although demand had stagnated for a decade following the price hikes of 1973, it resumed its 
upward course in 1983, growing by more than 30 percent (17.9 MMBD) by 2002. Of that growth, 
more than half was met by additional production in the Middle East. A similar pattern was expected 
during the first quarter of the 21st century. In late 2001, the EIA estimated that global oil 
consumption would rise from 77.1 MMBD to 118.8 MMBD in 2025, an increase of 54 percent. 
At the same time, it estimated that 48 percent of the increase in production required to meet that 
demand would come from the Persian Gulf, which would see its output nearly double, from 20.6 
MMBD to 40.5 MMBD.65 “If such forecasts are to be believed,” Fadhil Chalabi commented in 
2000, “the expansion of Iraqi oil production would be a prerequisite for satisfying world oil 
demand.”66 
A possible related benefit of freeing up Iraq’s production potential would take the form of a more 
stable world oil market through the creation of greater redundancy in oil supplies and, ideally, 
additional excess production capacity. Given the short-term inelasticity of demand for oil, the price 
is highly sensitive to fluctuations in supply. As noted above, a temporary reduction in oil supplies 
of less than ten percent in 1973 precipitated a four-fold increase in oil prices, and a brief but sharp 
drop in Iranian production prompted another doubling of oil prices in 1979. 
Since the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia has generally sought to use its excess production capacity to 
stabilize the oil market and prevent dramatic price increases by increasing production whenever 
supplies were disrupted elsewhere (more on this below). Beginning in the early 1990s, however, 
the kingdom had been producing at annual average rates (8.7 to 9.4 MMBD) within 1 to 2 MMBD 
of its total capacity, which limited its ability to respond to unexpected supply disruptions. More 
generally, as an authoritative 2001 report on energy policy noted, strong economic growth across 
the globe and new global demands for more energy have meant the end of sustained surplus 
capacity in hydrocarbon fuels and the beginning of capacity limitations. In fact, the world is 
precariously close to utilizing all of its available global oil production capacity, raising the chances 
of an oil-supply crisis with more substantial consequences than seen in three decades.67 
At the same time, the potential for supply disruptions–and concomitant sharp price increases–
seemed as great as ever. As one long-time observer of the oil markets remarked in early 2004, “A 
number of OPEC members (and for that matter non-OPEC producers as well) are suffering from 
internal socio-economic as well as internal and external political pressures which could boil over 
and, at a minimum, lead to temporary supply disruptions.”68 
Most importantly, growing tensions within Saudi Arabia itself had begun to call into question the 
kingdom’s very ability to maintain output at existing, not to mention higher, levels. Although this 
internal threat has become much more visible since the war, with high-profile terrorist attacks 
against non-U.S. targets, it was present well beforehand. Since the early 1980s, a combination of 
rapid population growth and declining oil revenue has resulted in economic stagnation, falling 
living standards, and rising unemployment. And in the last decade, the already substantial potential 
for political discontent had been reinforced by growing hostility toward the regime on the part of 
Islamic fundamentalists. Indeed, “one of Usama bin Ladin’s chief goals is toppling the Saudi 
monarchy, which he regards as corrupt and un-Islamic because it is allied with the United States 
and has allowed American troops to be stationed there since the Gulf War.”69 
To be sure, some Saudi experts have been more optimistic about the prospects for continued 
stability in the kingdom. “Right now,” Greg Gause wrote shortly after the Iraq war began, “the Al 
Saud face no serious challenge to their rule in Arabia.”70 Nevertheless, the potential costs of an 
upheaval in Saudi Arabia have dictated that the risks be taken very seriously. As Fadhil Chalabi 
observed with some understatement, “If anything happened to Saudi oil, there would be great oil 
market disruption.”71 Or, in the blunt words of Herbert Franssen, “in case of a major and prolonged 
supply disruption in Saudi Arabia, the world would not be able to cope…”72 
In this context, a significant increase in Iraqi oil production capacity could have been seen as 
necessary to help avert a potential future oil crisis. Given its tremendous production potential, Iraq 
is perhaps uniquely positioned to help to buffer the world oil supply in the event of such a 
contingency. Speaking just before the beginning of the war, Fadhil Chalabi reportedly stated “that 
Iraqi oil [is] important as the only alternative source of oil reserves of sufficient magnitude to 
compare with Saudi Arabia’s, and that increased Iraqi production capacity could be seen as 
establishing a more stabilized and secure system of supplies.”73 Likewise, an unnamed U.S. 
diplomatic source told an interviewer that “a rehabilitated Iraq is the only sound long-term strategic 
alternative to Saudi Arabia.”74  
E. Reducing Saudi Influence over World Oil Markets 
Even if worries about political instability in Saudi Arabia have been exaggerated and the House of 
Saud is able to surmount peacefully the internal challenges to its rule, freeing up Iraq’s oil 
production might have been expected to benefit the United States in yet another way. For at least 
a decade, Saudi Arabia has possessed the greatest oil production capacity–estimated at 10.0-10.5 
MMBD–of any country.75 Unique among oil producers, however, actual Saudi production levels 
have typically been substantially lower, leaving a significant amount of excess production 
capacity. Although the precise amount has been a well-kept secret and has in any case varied with 
production levels, it has generally amounted to at least half of all the surplus capacity in the world 
and an even higher percentage of that held by OPEC countries. As Morse and Richard noted in 
2002, Saudi Arabia’s “spare capacity is usually ample enough to entirely displace the production 
of another large oil-exporting country.”76 In addition, Saudi Arabia can raise and lower output 
levels relatively quickly.77 
This substantial amount of surplus capacity has afforded Saudi Arabia unrivaled influence in world 
oil markets. One way that the kingdom has employed it has been by stabilizing the market and 
preventing sharp price increases during times of uncertainty about supply or in response to actual 
supply disruptions. In the words of J. Robinson West, the president of the Petroleum Finance Co., 
“The Saudis are the central bank of oil. They provide stability and liquidity to the market.”78 
Saudi Arabia has used its surplus capacity in this way on several occasions. In late 1978 and again 
in 1980, it raised its oil production to as much as 10.4 MMBD to compensate first for the disruption 
of Iranian oil production caused by the Iranian Revolution and then the loss of both Iranian and 
Iraqi oil production following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. In response to the removal 
of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil from the market in 1990, Saudi Arabia increased its output by more than 
3 MMBD between August and December of that year. And during the first months of 2003, Saudi 
Arabia raised production by over 1 MMBD–to perhaps as much as 10.0 MMBD–to help 
compensate for losses from Venezuela, Nigeria, and then Iraq.79 
Successive U.S. governments have generally been supportive of and even encouraged this role, if 
only because no other potential market stabilizer was available. Nevertheless, U.S. reliance on 
Saudi Arabia to stabilize world oil markets has imposed costs and risks, which have seemed to 
grow only more acute in recent years. In the first place, this dependence has placed constraints on 
other aspects of U.S. policy toward the kingdom and the region. In particular, it has limited the 
ability of the United States to criticize Saudi policies and to promote desired domestic political, 
economic, and social reforms.  
In addition, Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity has given it a degree of influence over the oil market 
and other oil producers that has not always conformed to U.S. interests. On at least three occasions 
since the mid-1980s, Saudi Arabia has sought to deter or punish production increases by other 
large exporters by flooding the market with its own relatively inexpensive output, thereby 
undercutting the competition.80 Although the cost of oil has fallen in the short term, the long-term 
effect has been to discourage new investment and excess production and thereby prop up prices. 
Thus in the words of veteran oil market watchers Morse and Richard, Saudi spare capacity “is the 
energy equivalent of nuclear weapons, a powerful deterrent against those who try to challenge 
Saudi leadership and Saudi goals.”81  
The wisdom of relying on Saudi Arabia was further called into question in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Americans were shocked by the fact that a majority of the hijackers 
were Saudi nationals, and they have been troubled by Saudi Arabia’s mixed record of cooperation 
with the United States in the war on terrorism.82 Perhaps most disturbing of all has been the 
discovery that “for years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most 
important source of funds for al-Qa’ida; and for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to 
the problem.”83 
Indeed, the events of September 11 may have precipitated a sea change in U.S. attitudes toward 
Saudi Arabia. At the public level, “many Americans now perceive Saudi Arabia as a hotbed of 
Islamic fanatics bent on destroying the West.”84 And within the government, a number of members 
of Congress and a faction of the national security establishment now “believe Saudi Arabia is an 
unreliable ally that exerts too much influence over U.S. foreign policy.”85 Thus, as Washington 
Post columnist Michael Dobbs wrote shortly before the invasion of Iraq, “The Bush administration 
does not want to be held hostage to a potentially Arab country rife with anti-Americanism that has 
previously used oil as a weapon against the United States.”86 
In this context, the possibility of building up Iraq as an oil-producing counterweight to Saudi 
Arabia could have appeared very attractive. Perhaps few in the administration would have gone so 
far as to agree with Jay Mandle that “a U.S.-Iraq war would acquire a compliant swing producer 
in one blow.”87 But it would have been tempting to believe the assessment published in the New 
York Times just months before the war that, “revived by the lifting of sanctions and a flow of 
foreign investment, Iraq’s production could rival Saudi Arabia’s in five to seven years.”88And as 
the controversial July 2002 briefing by a Rand analyst for the Defense Advisory Board, which 
described Saudi Arabia as the “kernel of evil” in the Middle East, concluded, a pro-Western Iraq 
could reduce U.S. dependence on Saudi energy exports and enable the United States to force the 
monarchy to crack down on financing and support for terrorism within its boundaries.89 
CAVEATS 
Some people are likely to be skeptical of the preceding analysis, if only because there is as yet 
little or no evidence that such considerations actually influenced U.S. decision making in the run-
up to the Iraq war. More importantly, a number of questions could have been–and still can be–
raised about whether the United States could have truly expected to benefit, in the ways alleged 
above, from ending Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
A. Limitations on the Need for Iraqi Oil 
The first question that might have been raised is whether additional Iraqi oil production was really 
necessary. On the one hand, estimates of future demand for oil could have been exaggerated. On 
the other hand, it might have been possible to meet even a substantial growth in global 
consumption with increased production in other parts of the world. In this regard, particular 
attention has been devoted in recent years to the oil-producing potential of Russia and the Caspian 
region. 
As noted above, the EIA estimated in early 2003, in its most likely or reference case, that global 
oil consumption would rise from 77.1 MMBD to 118.8 MMBD in 2025, a 54 percent increase. For 
a variety of reasons, forecasts of future oil consumption are unreliable and subject to revision. For 
this reason, the EIA also offers projections that assume higher and lower levels of economic growth 
than are assumed in the reference case. Its January 2003 estimate for the low economic growth 
case forecast an increase in consumption to 98.8 MMBD in 2025, or 28 percent. Even this low 
forecast was nearly as great in relative terms as–and was greater in absolute terms than–the growth 
in oil consumption that took place over the nearly 20-year period between 1982 and 2002. The 
projection in the high-growth case, which should be no less likely than the low growth case, was 
for 145.7 MMBD in 2025, or an increase of 89 percent. 
Thus, even in the low growth case, the demand for oil was expected to increase by more than 20 
MMBD by 2025, and in the reference case, by more than 40 MMBD. Where would this additional 
oil come from? One important potential source was Russia, where production had been increasing 
by some 500 kbd per year and reached 8.6 MMBD in mid-2003. As a result, by 2003 Russia had 
become the second largest exporter after Saudi Arabia, with some 4 MMBD in exports, and a 
further expansion of exports by nearly 2 MMBD by the end of the decade seemed possible.90 Thus 
Morse and Richard argued that “[w]ith more efficient energy use in Russia and additional foreign 
investment, oil and gas production from the former Soviet Union could well take the lion’s share 
of new market growth for a decade or longer.”91 
But as Telhami and Hill noted, “Russia cannot ever displace the Middle East as the world’s primary 
supplier of oil….”92 In 2002, Russia had only 60 billion barrels in proven oil reserves, far less than 
either Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, or the UAE, not to mention Saudi Arabia.93 Thus, according to the 2003 
EIA forecast for the reference case, nearly half of the additional 2025 production (19.9 of 41.3 
MMBD) would come from the Persian Gulf, whereas the increased production in the former Soviet 
Union (including Russia and the Caspian region) would amount to only 7.1 MMBD.94 Moreover, 
“Russia’s uncertain tax and legal regimes [had] created disincentives to foreign and even domestic 
investment,” and the relatively high cost of new Russian oil would make continued production 
expansion more vulnerable there than in the Persian Gulf to fluctuations in oil prices.95 
In the Gulf itself, the EIA had regularly estimated that the bulk of the required growth in production 
capacity would be created in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, in early 2003, the EIA projected that Saudi 
capacity would increase from 10.2 MMBD in 2001 to between 17.6 and 30.3 MMBD in 2025.96 
But such dramatic growth in Saudi capacity and associated output could have been expected only 
to exacerbate the problems associated with U.S. dependence on the Saudis. Conversely, doubts 
have recently arisen about Saudi Arabia’s willingness or ability to come anywhere near these 
targets, resulting in a potentially large gap between global oil supply and demand.97 Thus 
substantial additional amounts of Iraqi oil should almost certainly have been seen as necessary or 
highly desirable. 
B. Foreseeable Obstacles to Increasing Iraqi Production Capacity  
A second important question that could have been asked is whether Iraq could actually realize its 
oil production and export potential. Above all, repair of the existing oil infrastructure and 
especially the development of new oil fields were expected to require substantial sums of money. 
Prewar estimates for the cost of restoring production to levels of 3.0-3.5 MMBD ran as high as $5 
billion to $7 billion, while the cost of further expanding production capacity to a total of just 6 
MMBD had been put at up to $30-40 billion.98 Yet in the short to medium term, Iraqi authorities 
were expected to have relatively little money to invest in the oil sector, given other pressing 
humanitarian and reconstruction needs.99 Thus, Fadhil Chalabi argued, “in order to secure capital, 
good management, and good market outlets, Iraq would have to allow the participation of foreign 
oil companies…and allow at least partial privatization.”100 
There was no guarantee, however, that foreign investment, especially in the required amounts, 
would be forthcoming. Iraqis were expected to be reluctant to allow international oil companies 
back in to the country. At least within the Iraqi oil bureaucracy, according Issam Chalabi, there 
was “close to unanimity”that “natural resources should remain under the sovereignty of the 
state.”101 And even if foreign investors were welcomed, they were not expected to come in 
significant numbers until security was restored, the political situation was clarified, and adequate 
legal protections were in place.102 
Nevertheless, once the right conditions were created, foreign investors were likely to find the 
opportunities irresistible. As Barnes, Jaffe, and Morse have noted, “Under optimal circumstances, 
Iraq could be very attractive to foreign investors, not least because of its low production costs and 
proximity to both the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean Sea, giving it easy access to major European 
and Asian markets.”103 Even under Saddam, a number of foreign oil companies, mainly from 
France, Russia, and China, had reportedly signed exploration, development, and production deals 
with Iraq totaling an estimated $38 billion.104 This investment was expected to result in an increase 
in Iraq’s production capacity of up to 4.7 MMBD, or enough to amortize the costs very quickly.105 
And even if significant foreign investment was not forthcoming, a future Iraqi government might 
have been expected to have little difficulty raising the necessary funds on its own. As Shafiq, has 
noted: 
An investment cost by the national oil company of the order of $5,000 per [barrel 
per day] would be recovered in seven months of production at a price of $24. Under 
normal conditions, the necessary capital could be borrowed from financial 
institutions. Production capacity would be built in stages in such a way that the 
capital inflow pays for the investment and original debt, along a predetermined time 
scale….The oil industry elsewhere has been built on a 80-90% loan basis, and there 
is no reason for Iraq’s industry not to consider this as one way to proceed.106 
C. International Political Constraints on Iraqi Oil Production 
Even if Iraq were to increase its oil production capacity substantially, perhaps to the point where 
it seriously rivaled that of Saudi Arabia, one could nevertheless have questioned whether external 
political considerations would have made Iraq reluctant to exploit this capacity fully. First, it was 
widely expected that any new Iraqi government would remain in OPEC, of which Iraq was a 
founding member. Doing so would both help the country establish its nationalist credentials and 
maintain good relations with its oil-producing neighbors.107 And although Iraqi oil output had not 
been constrained by OPEC quotas in recent years, it was likely to be brought back into the quota 
system as production increased. 
Nevertheless, OPEC production ceiling allocations are subject to renegotiation, and a future Iraqi 
government could make a compelling case for receiving a higher share than it did in the past 
(approximately 3.2 MMBD). After all, Saudi Arabia, with a comparable number of citizens, has 
enjoyed a quota of at least 7 MMBD (and usually more than 8 MMBD) since 1991,108 and the Iraqi 
population has suffered from years of unparalleled economic privation. Even if humanitarian 
arguments and pleas for equity were to fall on deaf ears, moreover, Iraq could in the longer term 
use the threat to flood the markets inherent in a growing production capacity to bargain for a 
significant increase in its quota. 
Alternatively, if Iraq were to disregard its production quota or to leave OPEC altogether, it would 
have to contend with possible adverse responses of other member states. Until Iraq built up 
sufficient export facilities of its own, for example, its neighbors could punish it by refusing to 
allow Iraqi oil to be piped or transported through their territories. Moreover, as one commentary 
noted, the Sheikhs in Riyadh are not going to want the Iraqis getting too uppity. And in order to 
teach the new Iraqi oil powers a lesson, the Saudis could well boost production significantly and 
allow prices to come down sharply. That in turn would slow critically needed investment in Iraq’s 
dilapidated oil sector… The Saudis might strangle the baby before it gets too big.109 
There were limits, however, to Saudi Arabia’s willingness to employ such punitive measures. An 
acute price war would hurt all the other oil producers, provoking widespread antipathy toward the 
kingdom. And given its heavy dependence on oil revenues, Saudi Arabia would suffer as well, 
even with substantial foreign assets to draw upon, and the existing domestic challenges would only 
be exacerbated. Consequently, some concluded, flooding the markets was a step the ruling family 
might no longer be able to afford and would be extremely reluctant to embark upon.110 
D. Risks of Military Action 
A final question that would have had to be considered by U.S. decision makers was whether the 
short-term risks of military action might outweigh the long-term benefits. It was widely expected 
that a war could result in a substantial short-term loss of production, disrupting oil supplies and 
possibly causing sharp price hikes.111 Even if U.S. and coalition forces sought to avoid attacking 
the oil infrastructure, strikes against other targets could result in collateral damage, and Saddam 
might order the destruction of oil facilities as part of a “scorched earth strategy.”112 In addition, Iraq 
might try to retaliate against U.S. allies by bombing or firing missiles at oil facilities in Saudi 
Arabia or Kuwait. Indeed, in anticipation of such attacks, Kuwait closed two of its northern oil 
wells prior to the war, losing 35,000 barrels per day of production, and announced it would close 
all of its wells in the north, which account for about 18 percent of its total production, if 
necessary.113 Moreover, any sudden production shutdowns could cause long-term damage to the 
affected oil reservoirs.114 
For the most part, however, experts regarded these risks as manageable, with some even claiming 
that a war in Iraq would have little short-term impact on world oil prices.115 First, there were good 
reasons to expect that the damage in the region could be limited. One authoritative report noted 
that it was unlikely that Iraqi troops or oil technocrats would carry out orders to destroy oil 
facilities, calling it a “low probability/high risk” scenario.116 And U.S. military operations could be 
designed to minimize the risks by quickly seizing oil fields and other critical facilities, as actually 
happened. Likewise, experts viewed attacks on oil facilities in other countries as unlikely to occur 
and even less likely to have any lasting effects. Saudi Arabia in particular had invested heavily in 
oil facility security and defenses, and Saudi officials claimed they could quickly repair any damage 
that nevertheless might be inflicted. It is worth noting that even the badly damaged Kuwaiti oil 
fields were largely restored within about a year after the end of the Gulf War.117 
Second, it was expected that whatever oil production might be temporarily lost as a result of a war 
could be compensated by other sources. In late 2002, OPEC members other than Iraq had about 6 
MMBD of unused production capacity that could be used to make up for any shortfall, and the 
U.S. Department of Energy estimated that Saudi Arabia alone “could flood the market within 30 
days with as much as 2 [MMBD] from wells it is not now using.”118 Although this margin turned 
out to be smaller than expected because of near simultaneous supply disruptions in Venezuela and 
Nigeria, it still proved to be sufficient. And had it not, the United States stood ready to release oil 
from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which contained some 600 million barrels, or enough to 
replace Iraq’s entire output for approximately 240 days.119 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has made two arguments about how the United States might have expected to benefit 
from going to war against Iraq. First, by removing Saddam Hussein and his Ba’thist regime from 
power, the United States would simultaneously eliminate the possibility that Iraq might once again 
seek to dominate the Gulf and, by extension, world oil supplies. Although Iraq did not pose an 
immediate military threat to its oil-rich neighbors, the likely weakening of UN sanctions and 
growing difficulties with maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Gulf meant that this 
possibility could not be excluded. Second, regime change could unleash Iraq’s tremendous 
potential as an oil producer, thereby helping meet future growth in world demand, buffer the oil 
market from possible supply disruptions, and reduce Saudi Arabia’s unrivaled and increasingly 
undesirable influence over the oil market. 
Of course, the fact that the United States might well have expected to benefit in these ways does 
not mean that such considerations played an important role–or any role at all–in the calculations 
of the Bush Administration. Publicly at least, U.S. officials offered a number of other seemingly 
plausible justifications for going to war. Consequently, it may not be possible to ascertain what, if 
any, role considerations of oil actually played until better records of the administration’s internal 
deliberations become available. Nevertheless, given existing doubts about whether other expected 
benefits of the war will in fact be realized, the oil-related consequences may turn out to be among 
the most important. 
A. Outcomes versus Expectations 
To what degree have such plausible, if hypothetical, expectations been borne out by events? On 
the one hand, the war has ended for the foreseeable future the regional threat posed by Iraq. Its 
conventional military forces have been disbanded, and its programs for creating weapons of mass 
destruction have either been eliminated or shown definitively not to exist. In fact, Iraq’s relations 
with the two states it most recently invaded, Iran and Kuwait, have become friendlier than at any 
time in many years. As an added benefit, the United States has been able to withdraw all of its 
combat forces from Saudi Arabia, which are no longer needed to enforce the no-fly-zones over 
Iraq or to deter a possible Iraqi attack on its neighbors. In so doing, it has removed one of the main 
sources of domestic criticism of the Saudi government and may have thereby further contributed 
to stability in world oil markets. 
On the other hand, the prospects for rehabilitating and expanding Iraq’s oil sector remain uncertain, 
at least in the short term. Some two years after President Bush declared the end of major combat 
operations, it is still too early to tell how much Iraq will eventually be able increase its oil 
production capacity and how quickly it will do so, given the persistent political instability and 
violence. In particular, the recovery of oil production and exports has been impeded by looting and 
sabotage, which has in turn darkened the investment climate. 
During the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a number of critical facilities, such as pumping stations, were not 
secured promptly and thus subjected to widespread looting. According to one estimate, 80 percent 
of the war-related damage to the oil infrastructure occurred in the several weeks after major combat 
operations ended.120 Even more importantly, since the invasion, the oil infrastructure has been 
subjected to more than 200 significant acts of sabotage by those opposed to the U.S. occupation 
or seeking to destabilize the new Iraqi regime.121 For the first year or so, most of these attacks 
occurred in the northern and central parts of the country. As a result, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan export 
pipeline to Turkey has been closed much of the time and otherwise able to deliver only a small 
fraction of its full capacity of 1.1 MMBD. In 2004, however, a number of attacks were directed at 
the southern oil facilities, which have been the main outlet for of Iraqi exports. Consequently, they 
too have been subjected to periodic shutdowns and restricted flows.122 
The overall effect of this sabotage campaign has been to slow the recovery of the oil sector and, in 
particular, to limit the volume of oil exports, thereby depriving Iraq of much needed financial 
resources. After the end of major combat operations, levels of oil production and exports grew 
more or less steadily, reaching an average of 2.3 MMBD and 1.8 MMBD, respectively, or just 
short of prewar levels, in April 2004. During the following months, however, both production and 
exports declined, with the latter dropping as low as 1.0 MMBD in August 2004.123 And as of 
January 2005, both continued to fall below their postwar highs.124 
As a result, oil export revenues have been well below expectations. They totaled only $5 billion in 
2003 and just over $17 billion in 2004, causing revenue losses variously estimated at between $7 
billion and $13 billion.125 In addition, the sabotage campaign has created an inhospitable investment 
climate for foreign oil companies, a number of which have been reluctant to bid on contracts for 
oil field evaluation and development because of the security situation.126 
Should these problems have been anticipated? With the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting to 
answer the question affirmatively. In fact, however, they tended to be overlooked or 
underestimated by all sides. Certainly, members of the Bush Administration appeared to believe 
that U.S. forces would be welcomed as liberators and that order–and Iraqi oil production–would 
be quickly restored. Before the war began, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz estimated 
that Iraqi oil revenues could bring in between $50 and $100 billion over the next two to three years, 
assuming that production could be quickly restored to about 3 MMBD.127 And as late as mid-April 
2003, Cheney and other administration officials opined that oil production could be as high as 2.5 
to 3 MMBD by the end of the year. Even at that time, the most serious challenges to Iraq’s future 
oil production were regarded as political and legal.128 As Wolfowitz told the press in July, perhaps 
somewhat self-servingly, no amount of advance planning could have foreseen the collapse of law 
and order.129 
Other observers, including those who opposed the war, however, were hardly more prescient. 
Arguments against an invasion focused on the flimsiness of the rationales offered by the 
administration and the risks of military action, not the longer-term difficulties of pacifying and 
stabilizing Iraq. A few analyses pointed to the dangers of a breakdown of law and order or civil 
war, but suggested that the former could be managed through carefully crafted occupation policies 
and that the latter would most likely be precipitated by a premature U.S. withdrawal, not an 
American presence.130 Only one little-remarked study raised the possibility of terrorism and other 
violent measures directed at U.S. forces, but even it judged that a mass uprising was “unlikely in 
the early stages of any U.S. occupation of Iraq, probably up to at least a year.”131Thus it seems fair 
to conclude that virtually no one anticipated the rapid development of a widespread insurgency 
marked by persistent attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure. 
Moreover, some detailed reviews of postwar developments in Iraq have argued that these problems 
could have been avoided and thus were largely of the administration’s own making.132According 
to these analyses, in the months immediately preceding and following the invasion, U.S. leaders 
made a number of errors, both of omission and commission, that set the stage for the insurgency. 
Among the more important mistakes, they failed to secure broad international support, which cast 
doubt on the legitimacy of the war and left the United States largely on its own to establish stability 
in Iraq. They did not prepare adequately for the period after hostilities and may even have 
dismissed much of the planning that was conducted prior to the war under the auspices of the State 
Department. And they did not deploy sufficient ground forces to establish order and maintain 
security, especially in view of the early decision to disband the remnants of the Iraqi army.133 
B. Implications for U.S. Policy 
Notwithstanding these problems, the United States continues to have a strong interest in seeing 
that Iraq first complete the rehabilitation of its oil sector and then increase its oil production and 
export capacity, at least as long as the United States and its major economic partners remain 
heavily dependent on foreign oil. Indeed, unexpected growth in world demand in combination with 
actual and potential supply disruptions in a number of key oil producing countries, including Saudi 
Arabia, Russia, and Nigeria, means that the need for Iraqi oil is even greater than anyone could 
have anticipated just two years ago. From this interest follow at least two implications for U.S. 
policy in the short to medium term. 
First, the United States should assign higher priority to providing security for Iraq’s oil 
infrastructure from sabotage. During the invasion, U.S. forces moved quickly to seize the oil fields 
and some other oil-related sites, such the Ministry of Oil building in Baghdad. Given the limited 
number of American and other coalition troops in the country, however, the United States then 
largely turned over the task of protecting oil facilities to private firms. Overall, it has awarded 
contracts totaling about $100 million, primarily to Erinys, to train as many as 14,500 armed 
security guards and to provide aerial surveillance.134 According to one report, the guards are 
generally seen as underpaid (they earn between $2 and $4 per day), demoralized, and lacking in 
the equipment and intelligence they need.135 Regardless of the causes, the provision of security has 
been less than adequate. 
Given the difficulty of obtaining detailed information about the security situation, it is hard for an 
outside observer to offer precise policy prescriptions. Nevertheless, at least three possible and 
potentially complementary approaches suggest themselves.136 One would be for the United States 
to spend even more money on private contractors and, after the contracts expire, in the form of 
grants to the Iraqi government for the purpose of securing the oil infrastructure. Indeed, in 
September 2004, President Bush sought to increase spending on law enforcement and security by 
$1.8 billion in Iraq, although it was not clear if any of this money was intended for the protection 
of oil facilities in particular.137 A second approach would be for the United States to devote more 
of its own military resources to the protection of especially high-value targets, although this might 
require the deployment of additional troops to Iraq. U.S. forces already guard the critical offshore 
oil terminals in the Persian Gulf, through which most Iraqi exports have flowed, but they have not 
assumed much responsibility for protecting the equally important pipelines that transport oil to 
those terminals and to the Turkish border in the north.138 Finally, the protection of the oil 
infrastructure might be a promising area for seeking to involve an effective international force. 
The potential rewards would be great, since increased oil production and exports would be seen as 
benefiting both the Iraqi people and the international community. At the same time, the costs and 
risks would be relatively low, since most of the oil infrastructure is located away from heavily 
populated areas. 
A second implication is that the United States should be prepared to devote yet more resources to 
helping Iraq rehabilitate and expand its oil sector. In 2003, the Congress appropriated nearly $2.7 
billion for repairing, maintaining, and upgrading Iraqi oil facilities.139 And in September 2004, the 
Bush Administration indicated that it wanted to invest an additional $450 million in increasing 
Iraq’s production capacity by an additional 650,000 barrels per day within ten months.140 
One problem has been the slowness with which the appropriations have been spent. As of mid-
2004, work had begun on only 119 of 226 postwar oil reconstruction projects, and only half the 
work had been completed in 94 of those underway.141 And by January 2005, of the $1.7 billion 
designated for oil infrastructure in the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, $941 
million had been obligated and only $123 million had been expended.142 Even when fully utilized, 
moreover, this U.S. contribution would fall well short of meeting Iraq’s near-term needs. As early 
as October 2003, official estimates of the cost of rebuilding just the oil industry had risen to some 
$8 billion over four years.143 And a more recent report put the amount needed for repairs, 
maintenance, and operations at $4 billion in 2004 alone.144 
At the same time, Iraq’s own ability to finance this work has been constrained by lower-than-
expected oil revenues. And it is unlikely that much help will be forthcoming from the international 
community. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank together have so far indicated that 
they are prepared to lend Iraq a total of no more than $5.5 billion to $9.25 billion over the next 
several years, and individual countries have pledged another $8 billion, against an overall estimate 
of $55 billion in reconstruction needs between 2004 and 2007.145 
Thus in the short- to medium-term, additional U.S. assistance may be essential for the successful 
rehabilitation of the Iraqi oil industry, not to mention any capacity expansion. Beyond the obvious 
U.S. self-interest in helping Iraq in this way, such assistance could be justified as compensation 
for the unexpected loss of oil revenues that occurred during the American occupation of the 
country. And as long as oil prices remain above $30 per barrel, every additional 1 MMBD in 
production and export capacity that the United States funds could generate upwards of $10 billion 
in revenue annually and thus would go far toward helping Iraq become financially self-sufficient. 
Indeed, in the longer term, the problem is likely to take care of itself, once the political situation 
stabilizes. Unless Iraq descends into anarchy, just about any government(s) that emerge(s) will 
have strong incentives to restore and then expand the oil sector. It may be true that “a pro-American 
Iraq is not in the cards; the best that can be hoped for now is an uneasy partnership based on an 
unsentimental assessment of shared interests.”146 But barring the establishment of a violently anti-
American regime that is subject to U.S. sanctions, among those shared interests will almost 
certainly be a substantial increase in Iraqi oil production and exports. 
Table 1: Oil Consumption and Imports, 2002 (millions of barrels per day) 
  
Source: BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2003. 
  
  
  Consumption Gross 
Imports 
Net 
Imports 
Imports 
from the 
Middle East 
Middle East Imports 
as % of Consumption 
United States 19.7 11.4 10.4 2.30 11.7% 
Europe (less 
Former 
Soviet 
Union) 
16.0 11.9 9.66 3.23 20.2% 
Japan 5.3 5.07 4.99 3.92 74.0% 
Subtotal (US, 
Europe, and 
Japan) 
41.0 28.4 25.1 9.45 23.0% 
World Total 75.7 43.6 43.6 18.1 23.4% 
US, Europe, 
and Japan as 
Share of 
World 
54.2% 65.1% 57.6% 52.2%   
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